Rational decision and causality /
Ellery Eells.
- New York: Cambridge university press, 2016.
- xi, 216 p.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1 Bayesianism Subjective expected utility Foundations of subjective probability Learning 2 The philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theory A theory of human rationality A theory of human behavior Foundations and applications of subjective probability 3 Bayesian decision theories: some details Ramsey Savage Jeffrey Existence theorem Uniqueness theorem A comparison 4 The counterexamples 5 Causal decision theories Gibbard and Harper Skyrms Lewis Discussion 6 Common causes, reasons and symptomatic acts 7 A general defense of PMCEU The ''tickle defense'' The more general setting The weaker assumptions Causes, reasons and probability The general defense 8 Newcomb's paradox
First published in 1982, Ellery Eells' original work on rational decision making had extensive implications for probability theorists, economists, statisticians and psychologists concerned with decision making and the employment of Bayesian principles.