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020			_a9780521037860
041			_aeng
082			_a121 _bKVA
100			_aKvanvig, Jonathan L.
245		4	_aThe value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding / _cJonathan L. Kvanvig.
260			_aNew York: _bCambridge university press, _c2003.
300			_axvi, 216 p.
490			_aCambridge Studies in Philosophy
500			_a
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505			_a1. The value of knowledge is external to it. The pragmatic theory ; Plato and the tethering of true belief ; Knowledge and action 2. The value of true belief. The value of belief ; The value of truth ; Conclusion 3. The value of justification. Externalist accounts ; Justification accounts ; Two kinds of means to a goal 4. Reliabilism, normativity, and the special promise of virtue. Epistemology ; Zagzebski's virtue theory ; Virtue epistemology and credit for true belief ; A further benefit of virtue epistemology? ; Conclusion 5. The Gettier problem and the value of knowledge. The Gettier problem ; Gettier-like cases ; The appeal to accidentality and a general concern ; Approaches to the Gettier problem ; Counterfactual and defeasibility approaches to the Gettier problem ; Conclusion 6. Knowledge as irreducibly valuable. Curiosity and the intrinsic value of knowledge ; The desire to know ; Conclusion 7. Epistemic attitudinalism : semantic and pragmatic approaches. Semantic and pragmatic versions of epistemic attitudinalism ; Epistemic attitudinalism and the value of knowledge ; The failure of epistemic attitudinalism ; Conclusion 8. Knowledge and understanding. Understanding, knowledge, and logical form ; Understanding is not a species of knowledge ; The value of understanding ; Conclusion 9. Conclusion
520			_aJonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge and questions the assumption that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts.
650			_aKnowledge, Theory of.
942			_cENG
999			_c189499 _d189499